Louisiana State University Law Center

LSU Law Digital Commons
Journal Articles

Faculty Scholarship

2012

Government RX--Back to the Future in Science Funding? The Next
Era in Drug Development
Michael J. Malinowski
Louisiana State University Law Center, mjmalin@lsu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Law Commons

Repository Citation
Malinowski, Michael J., "Government RX--Back to the Future in Science Funding? The Next Era in Drug
Development" (2012). Journal Articles. 24.
https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/faculty_scholarship/24

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at LSU Law Digital Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of LSU Law Digital Commons.
For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.

FOR EDUCATIONAL USE ONLY
51 U. Louisville L. Rev. 101
University of Louisville Law Review
2012
Articles
*101 GOVERNMENT RX-BACK TO THE FUTURE IN SCIENCE FUNDING? THE NEXT ERA IN DRUG
DEVELOPMENT

Michael J. Malinowski [FNa1]
Copyright (c) 2012 University of Louisville; Michael J. Malinowski
We shall not cease from exploration [a]nd the end of all our exploring [w]ill be to arrive where we
started [a]nd know the place for the first time.
-T.S. Eliot [FN1]

I. Introduction: 5:30 AM, Monday, July 16, 1945

[T]he atomic age began. While Manhattan staff members watched anxiously, the device exploded over
the New Mexico desert, vaporizing the tower and turning asphalt around the base of the tower to green
sand. The bomb released approximately 18.6 kilotons of power, and the New Mexico sky was suddenly
brighter than many suns. Some observers suffered temporary blindness even though they looked at the
brilliant light through smoked glass. Seconds after the explosion came a huge blast, sending searing heat
across the desert and knocking some observers to the ground. A steel container weighing over 200 tons,
standing a half-mile from ground zero, was knocked ajar. . . . As the orange and yellow fireball stretched
up and spread, a second column, narrower than the first, rose and flattened into a mushroom shape,
thus providing the atomic age *102 with a visual image that has become imprinted on the human
consciousness as a symbol of power and awesome destruction. [FN2]
The uranium atom was split successfully in early 1939. [FN3] Fearing that the Nazis could and would
develop an atomic bomb, the United States undertook the Manhattan Project to preempt the threat to
the very existence of democratic society. [FN4] The Project was a massive federal government hands-on
undertaking-a science research and development (“R&D”) mission that orchestrated establishment of
several laboratories at sites across the United States, an army of researchers, and input from industry,
most notably DuPont and the Kellogg Company. [FN5]
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During the remainder of the twentieth century, U.S. investment became a concerted effort to promote
both the advancement of science through academia and American global economic competitiveness.
[FN6] This duality served the United States well given that industry and academia did not share a science
culture at the time and tended to remain separate. [FN7] The U.S. government acted as an intermediary
and invested to advance science on both fronts. [FN8] Former President Eisenhower recognized this rite
of passage and its implications and shared his vision in a farewell address he delivered through a radio
and television broadcast on January 17, 1961:
[R]esearch has become central; it also becomes more formalized, complex, and costly. A steadily
increasing share is conducted for, by, or at the direction of, the Federal government.
....
The prospect of domination of the nation's scholars by Federal employment, project allocations, and the
power of money is ever present and is gravely to be regarded. Yet, in holding scientific research and
discovery in respect, as we should, we must also be alert to the equal and *103 opposite danger that
public policy could itself become the captive of a scientific-technological elite. It is the task of
statesmanship to mold, to balance, and to integrate these and other forces, new and old, within the
principles of our democratic system-ever aiming toward the supreme goals of our free society. [FN9]
As discussed in detail in Part II, subsequent to the Manhattan Project, three distinguishable eras of U.S.
government science funding have unfolded. [FN10] In prescription drug development, with its enormous
human health and economic implications, much reliance has been placed upon industry. [FN11] Industry
has taken responsibility for the vast majority of clinical research and drug distribution and marketing,
while the U.S. government has generously funded basic (bench) research, largely through the National
Institutes of Health (“NIH”) and National Academy of Sciences (“NAS”). [FN12] Among governments, the
United States remains the lead global financial investor and producer of biomedical R&D by a wide
margin. [FN13]
Unfortunately, the United States has sunk into a drug development dilemma, which is addressed in Part
III. Government funding of basic research has gifted industry with resources for drug R&D, including a
map *104 of the human genome. [FN14] Nevertheless, as observed by Dr. Francis Collins, Director of the
NIH, the drug industry's “productivity has been declining for fifteen years” and shows no signs of
improving. [FN15] This Article proposes that the federal government respond to the drug development
dilemma by, in the spirit of the Manhattan Project and Human Genome Project (“HGP”), reducing
reliance on industry and substantially expanding the presence of both NIH and the Food and Drug
Administration (“FDA”) in human clinical research.

II. Science Funding: The U.S. Legacy [FN16]
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“The threat of annihilation of democratic society during World War II . . . by advances in technology
inspired tremendous U.S. investment to raise the base of science.” [FN17] The United States continued
and increased its investment, other governments did the same and, as explained below, government
involvement matured into our present, shared research establishment-with the fulcrum for drug
development resting heavily on industry and commercialization. [FN18] This evolution unfolded in three
eras distinguishable by their origins and nature: the military-industrial complex (“MIC”) era (1939 to the
present); an era of academia-industry separation *105 (mid-1940s into the 1980s); and an era of
government-academia-industry integration which commenced in 1980 and extends into the present.
[FN19]

A. The Military-Industrial Complex Era

The MIC era grew out of World War II (“WWII”). The United States entered WWII without a standing
army and with little meaningful infrastructure to manufacture military weapons. [FN20] The war effort
imposed a focus on application in science and technology, and the U.S. government became a contract
purchaser and financier of invention by both academia and industry. [FN21] The United States left WWII
with established, expansive, and ongoing relationships with industry and academia. [FN22] Generally,
the flow of federal funding shifted into relationships with industry to build the MIC and into separate
university grant funding-academic research, meaning research for the sake of research rather than more
immediate commercial application. [FN23] The latter was advanced immensely through Science: The
Endless Frontier, [FN24] a 1945 report to President Truman from Vannevar Bush, Director of the Office
of Scientific Research and Development. “Its main goal was to recommend establishing the United
States Office of Research and Development, which in time morphed into the National Science
Foundation (NSF) and NIH, chiefly to fund the basic research needed to undergird the full range of
applied sciences.” [FN25] Financial support of the same became a permanent major expenditure and
budget priority. [FN26] The MIC continued, just as President Eisenhower predicted, and raged in the
decades following his farewell address, culminating in today's “War on Terror.” [FN27]

*106 B. Era of Academia-Industry Separation

The era of separation between academia and industry was facilitated by a duality in federal funding. To
the side of MIC funding, most research grants to universities were issued through review by academic
peers to promote research for the sake of advancing science, largely removed from any serious
consideration of application. [FN28] University researchers applied for the same. [FN29] Industry was
concerned about commingling their research investments with universities' for fear of government

claims to resulting inventions. [FN30] This division remained until the 1980s, [FN31] which reinforced a
separation between academia and industry in science research. [FN32]
MIC continued on: the 1950s and early 1960s were dominated by the Cold War and a series of
confrontations centered on science-Sputnik 1, launched on October 4, 1957, followed by the Bay of Pigs
Invasion, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and placement of man on the moon, all of which increased demands
that federally funded science produce tangible applications. [FN33] The federal government grew
impatient with academic research and diminished its funding. [FN34] “The annus horribilis, 1968,
brought an end to the expansion of academic research and anguish over the role that the university had
assumed.” [FN35] While universities served as bastions for *107 anti-government protests, government
and public sentiment soured further. [FN36] The 1970s proved a challenging decade for academia as
government decided to give much less. [FN37]

C. Era of Integration Among Government, Academia, and Industry

Integration among government, academia, and industry was a phenomenon of the 1980s. By the end of
the 1970s, the country faced double-digit unemployment. [FN38] A severe oil shortage necessitated
harsh rationing and caused prices at the pump to skyrocket. [FN39] The country was in an economic
crisis, and the public was frustrated with both big government and big business. [FN40] Demand for
more R&D and economic stimulus grew deafening. [FN41] Congress was shoved into action. [FN42]
Taxpayer investment in academic research was not leaving university filing cabinets, and legislation was
enacted to bust them open to help stimulate the economy. [FN43] Specifically, Congress enacted
legislation that put into motion an intense academia-industry science policy that, through globalization,
has impacted the world's science norms. The primary pieces of legislation, both enacted in 1980, are the
Bayh-Dole Act [FN44] and the Stevenson-Wydler Act: [FN45]
*108 The legislative intent of Bayh-Dole was, through reform of patent policy related to governmentsponsored research: (1) to enable and encourage universities, not-for-profit corporations, and small
businesses to patent and commercialize their federally-funded inventions and (2) to allow federal
agencies to grant exclusive licenses for their technology to provide more incentive to businesses. [FN46]
The net result is a “give away” of invention created with federal taxpayer dollars for commercial
application, which has integrated government, academia, and industry in science research. [FN47] This
policy effectively “unlocked all the inventions and discoveries that had been made in laboratories
throughout the U.S. with the help of taxpayers' money.” [FN48] The impact on research institutions,
researchers, and science itself has been profound: “A fruitful collaboration between academic
researchers and industry promised to fuel not only economic development but also new sources of
revenue for universities. A vast movement of privatization was underway by the mid-1980s, and it
reinvigorated research universities.” [FN49]

From the 1990s onward, government, academia, and industry have integrated with explosive intensity,
“giving rise to all the benefits, concerns, *109 and controversies that accompany such dramatic and
rapid change.” [FN50] As stated by one observer, “It has turned universities into commercial entities,
created a multibillion-dollar industry of technology transfer, and subsidized virtually every
biotechnology company and discovery of the past twenty-five years.” [FN51] The integration has gone
global. [FN52]

III. The Drug Development Dilemma

Drug development has made a profound impact on human health. As recognized by Dr. Marcia Angell,
former Editor in Chief of the New England Journal of Medicine and vocal critic of today's drug industry:
No one would want to be without, say, insulin for diabetes, antimicrobial agents to fight infections,
vaccines to prevent a host of serious diseases, anticlotting agents to treat heart attacks, chemotherapy
for cancer, a panoply of effective painkillers and anesthetics, and many others. Gleevec is a major
advance, as are Epogen and Taxol. Prilosec is important, too, as are statins and ACE inhibitors and many
other drugs. All of these agents have extended and greatly improved our lives. [FN53]
Moreover, although the secrecy of data makes the cost of developing new drugs mere estimations, it is
beyond dispute that the endeavor is extraordinarily expensive and time-consuming, and the clinical
failure rate is towering-approximately 80%. [FN54] Industry has invested enormously in recent years-for
example, $45.8 billion in 2009. [FN55] The U.S. government also has invested tens of billions of dollars
annually: the NIH budget *110 continues to hover at approximately $30.9 billion annually, [FN56] and
tens of billions in taxpayer dollars have been invested annually since the 1990s. [FN57]
Despite these accomplishments, enormous industry and government investment in basic research,
[FN58] and the infusion of scores of research-enabling technologies in recent years, most notably the
map of the human genome, [FN59] overall drug development has sunk into a state of doldrums-a
fifteen-year slump. [FN60] Shockingly, in 2010, Pfizer Inc., the world's largest research-based
pharmaceutical company, did not secure a single new drug approval. [FN61] “The bottom line has been
a 45 percent decline in the company's share price between 2000 and 2005. Unfortunately, many of the
likely replacements are targeted for niche markets that cannot possibly generate the sales of the huge
products that preceded them.” [FN62] Discouraged, large drug makers are investing less: [FN63]
TABULAR OR GRAPHIC MATERIAL SET FORTH AT THIS POINT IS NOT DISPLAYABLE
*111 In addition, the perception of the public and many in the medical profession of the
pharmaceuticals on the market is grossly inflated. Though most of those in need of health care want to
believe wholeheartedly in pharmaceuticals, prescription drugs generally are unpredictable: a mere onethird act as expected when prescribed to patients. [FN64] This uncertainty *112 “exposes patients to
potentially harmful drug interactions and delays potentially effective or the ‘right’ treatment.” [FN65]

Also, adverse drug reactions cause more than two million hospitalizations each year and 100,000 deaths.
[FN66] In fact, the United States experiences more deaths from the legal use of prescription medications
than from automobile accidents. [FN67] The poor performance of drugs already on pharmacy shelves
contributes to the fact that medicine remains much more of an art than a science:
Even today, with a high-tech health-care system that costs the nation $2 trillion a year, there is little or
no evidence that many widely used treatments and procedures actually work better than various
cheaper alternatives.
....
. . . And while there has been progress in recent years, most of these physicians say the portion of
medicine that has been proven effective is still outrageously low-in the range of 20% to 25%. [FN68]
*113 Poor drug performance has shaken confidence in the FDA and triggered congressional action,
[FN69] scathing reports from the Government Accountability Office and the Institute of Medicine,
[FN70] and class action litigation, underscoring that drug development is in a problematic state and
certainly not living up to its potential. [FN71] The FDA had to withdraw ten of its approved drugs for
safety concerns between 2000 and March 2006, [FN72] and “[i]t has been estimated that as many as
half of all new drugs have at least one serious adverse effect that is unknown at the time of drug
approval.” [FN73] Vioxx is a notorious agency mistake-“a ‘scarlet letter’ the FDA is likely to wear for
years to come.” [FN74] More mistakes were admitted in the fall of *114 2010. [FN75] The FDA
“concluded that in some cases two types of drugs that were supposed to be preventing serious medical
problems were, in fact, causing them.” [FN76] Specifically, Avandia, prescribed heavily to treat type-2
diabetes, was associated with an increased risk of heart attacks and strokes-a serious problem for the
target patient group given that two-thirds of diabetics die of heart problems. [FN77] Bisphosphonates,
prescribed to prevent bone loss, was determined to actually cause thigh bone fractures and jawbone
degeneration. [FN78] Again, frustrated, industry is paring back on research and channeling its funds into
marketing. [FN79] It has outsourced clinical research to contract research organization (“CRO”) bean
counters, who just make the data needed for approval happen. [FN80] Yet, in recent years government
has increased dependence on industry to get clinical research done. [FN81]

*115 IV. A Law-Policy Fix for the Drug Development Doldrums

Many commercial drug developers and their supporters claim that the drop off in new drug approvals is
due to over-regulation. [FN82] In fact, the opposite is true: industry is clinging to the low science and
regulatory standards of the past, making bad and expensive decisions based upon these low standards,
stretching the commercial lives of pharmaceuticals through manipulation of the patent system, and
contriving “me too” drugs rather than engaging in genuine innovation. [FN83]

Lax regulatory standards introduced in 1997 under the FDA Modernization Act (“FDAMA”) have enticed
industry to engage in a race to the bottom. [FN84] Section 506B of FDAMA introduced a presumption in
*116 favor of market approval contingent on follow-up studies, [FN85] which the FDA has not been
enforcing and industry has not been performing. [FN86] This presumption is misplaced given that drug
sponsors exercise extensive control over the content of new drug applications, [FN87] and the standard
for market approval is to just outperform a placebo-meaning to be better than *117 nothing-with
tolerable adverse events. [FN88] Once drugs reach pharmacy shelves, physicians have the discretion to
prescribe them off-label regardless of the limitations of the data that put them on the market. [FN89]
The approval process does not include head-to- head comparisons between new drugs and those
already on the market. [FN90]
The quantity and scale of clinical trials underway today is unprecedented-a reflection of the desperation
of the biopharmaceutical sectors to replenish their revenue streams. [FN91] Clinical research is highly
susceptible to manipulation. [FN92] As observed by Dr. Angell, “Trials can be rigged in a dozen ways, and
it happens all the time.” [FN93] The so-called gold standard for generating clinical data is group design,
which produces mathematical abstracts (probabilities) that represent the group under study as a whole,
but not necessarily any individuals used to trigger the data. [FN94] Moreover, clinical research has been
shifted from academic medical centers to commercial service providers- CROs. [FN95] An academic
check on the *118 integrity of clinical research, the public nature of research promoted through the
involvement of academia, has been lost. [FN96]
As Dr. Angell explains:
Until the 1980s, researchers were largely independent of the companies that sponsored their work.
Drug companies would give a grant to an academic medical center, then step back and wait for faculty
researchers to produce the results. They hoped their product would look good, but they had no way of
knowing for sure. They certainly did not attempt to tell the researchers how to run their clinical trials.
Now, however, companies are involved in every detail of the research-from design of the study through
analysis of the data to the decision whether to publish the results. That involvement has made bias not
only possible but extremely likely. Researchers don't control clinical trials anymore; sponsors do. [FN97]
*119 When academic medical centers are involved, they often hold equity interests in research
outcomes. [FN98] Many senior NIH scientists also hold financial entanglements in research outcomes.
[FN99] The norm has become commercial controls on publication and a loss of data transparency.
[FN100]
Although the biopharmaceutical sectors maintain an army of lobbyists in the nation's capital, [FN101]
disappointment with drug development has inspired law-policy interventions. Congress enacted the
Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, which demands more scrutiny for market
approval, extensive surveillance of pharmaceuticals on the market with a focus on health care
outcomes, and dissemination of much more information to health care providers. [FN102] Also,
regulations to protect human subjects are finally being revisited. [FN103]

Still, more meaningful government intervention is needed to align drug development with its potential
and to break through the existing doldrums. In the spirit of the Manhattan Project and HGP, the federal
government should undertake clinical research and lessen reliance on industry for *120 advanced drug
development. [FN104] There is some movement in this direction. Dr. Francis Collins, leader of the U.S.
government's HGP effort and Director of the NIH, has proposed direct government involvement to
convert the map of the human genome into human health benefits. [FN105] Specifically, he has
proposed a National Center for Advancing Translational Sciences (“NCATS”) to lift the drug development
industries out of their steep fifteen-year slump. [FN106] “The central role for the proposed Center
would be to establish and provide focused, integrated, and systematic approaches for building new
bridges that link basic discovery research with therapeutics development and clinical care.” [FN107] The
NIH is dissolving one of its twenty-seven existing entities to form NCATS and provide approximately $1
billion in funding. [FN108] According to Janet Woodcock and her co-authors, there is new-found
appreciation for the fact that “[i]nnovative drug development requires science and regulation to
advance in concert. Nowhere is this need more apparent or urgent than in *121 the development of
combination therapies.” [FN109] Contemporary genetics is about understanding disease pathways
rather than just eliminating symptoms, and specialty care is emerging as a dominant focus in new drug
approvals and patient treatment. [FN110]
The federal government is moving in the right direction with NCATS, but it must go beyond basic (bench)
science and plunge into clinical research. Obviously, the commercial sector is not rising to the occasion-it
is not producing in spite of the proliferation of enabling technologies bequeathed to it through HGP and
extraordinary investment. [FN111] The biopharmaceutical sectors have tremendous potential they
simply are not realizing. [FN112]
Just as the U.S. government intervened successfully in science to preempt Nazi competitors in the
creation of the atomic bomb and more recently to complete a map of the human genome, the biology
counterpart to the periodic table that evolves science into penetrating disease pathways, the United
States must intervene in clinical research to boost drug development. [FN113] The NIH and FDA should
work jointly in the endeavor given their distinguishable but complementary science focuses and staff
skill sets.
The FDA has precedent to intervene in clinical research independent from commercial sponsors.
Through the Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act, Congress enabled the agency to get pediatric studies
done in spite of industry resistance. [FN114] The Act established a trust fund, which the FDA draws from
to contract with third parties to accomplish the studies needed. [FN115] There also is NIH precedent.
The NIH has made contributions that have directly facilitated private sector drug development, including
the Molecular Libraries Program, the Therapeutics for Rare and Neglected Diseases Program, the Rapid
Access to Interventional Development *122 Program, and the Clinical and Translational Science Awards
Program. [FN116] This precedent is a foundation for the FDA and NIH to build upon and contribute to
human health.
Professor Epstein cautions against the infusion of new regulatory standards and expansion of the role of
government in drug development:

No way exists for government, try as it may, to take the lead in developing new commercial processes.
Likewise, no way exists for government to take over the task of ensuring that all individuals receive the
safest and most effective care, or even to set by edict some minimum threshold with which all private
firms must comply. The implicit paternalism of the FDA and the tort system hurts the very people it is
intended to help. [FN117]
Henry Miller shares Professor Epstein's sentiment that the U.S. government should leave drug
development to the private sector, and he opposes NCATS: “Government bureaucrats are rarely leaders
of technological innovation. They are not qualified to act as venture capitalists in choosing the most
promising and deserving commercial product to fund and develop.” [FN118]
The thrust of Professor Epstein's position is that, in drug development, the low-hanging fruit has been
picked and a slump was inevitable:
I stated at the outset of this book that it is hard to return the pharmaceutical industry to its glory days of
fifty or sixty years ago. In the interim we have gathered all the low-hanging fruit. But the current
challenge is not whether we can recreate the heady optimism of Vannevar Bush's 1945 praise of The
Endless Frontier, any more than it is whether we can make the California gold rush last forever. [FN119]
*123 Reality is that genomics and related disciplines (proteomics, bioinformatics, pharmacogenomics,
and pharmacogenetics, to name just a few) have seeded new orchards with acreage that melts deeply
into the distant horizon-adding dimensions of potential to the frontier of drug development. The drug
development past, just taking away symptoms without understanding disease pathways, fortunately is
not a reflection of the present and future. Genomics, the study of genetic expression, has introduced a
new beginning, and there is an obligation to embrace it in drug development and to contribute as
meaningfully as possible to human health. People's lives depend upon it-literally. The U.S. government
must rise to the occasion and expend the resources necessary to better align drug development with its
potential.

V. Conclusion

Reliance on government to solve dilemmas is not popular at this time, but in science, the U.S.
government has a legacy of rising to the occasion. We need another intervention. This Article has
embraced NCATS and proposed that more direct government involvement in human clinical research is
necessary to lift drug development out of its doldrums. We already have made such an investment
through HGP, and so much human life is at stake. Lost opportunity and, to say the least, disappointing
performance for a sector that impacts all levels of human health and the national economy so
fundamentally demands a government intervention in the spirit of the Manhattan Project and HGP.
Industry pushed completion of the map of the human genome, but it did so by drawing from the public
domain and working off of what the government effort had accomplished-the intellectual property

placed in the public domain. The government's efforts also inspired a bountiful bouquet of enabling
technologies along the way, from gene sequencing capabilities to DNA chips, that have enabled the
global biotechnology sector. The project never would have been started without the U.S. government
making a decision to fund it from 1988 to 2003 with a $3 billion investment. [FN120]
It is time to move forward, and to make medical sense out of the map of the human genome and the
universe of enabling technologies the effort has inspired. Drug development is off track, dismally so, and
a government intervention is essential to reach the potential already framed by the vested government
investment in the map of the human genome. It is time to *124 move forward and embrace the
opportunity to improve human health introduced through contemporary genomic science.
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[FN95]. Angell, supra note 12, at 100-01. Academic medical centers have been largely pushed out of
clinical research, with industry favoring CROs. Id. “Whereas in 1990, about 80 percent of industry-

sponsored trials were done at academic institutions, within a decade that share had dropped to less
than 40 percent.” Id. at 101. Medical schools and teaching hospitals, facing revenue reductions due to
shrinking patient care reimbursements and cuts in medical education support, are forced to compete
with CROs-and pressured to become more accommodating to pharmaceutical sponsors of trials. Id.
[FN96]. According to Dr. Angell:
[I]nstead of relying on academic centers to test their drugs, drug companies turned to the new for-profit
research industry that grew up to serve them. . . . [T]hese companies contract with private doctors to
collect data on patients in their offices according to company instructions. The doctors are not
themselves trained researchers, so they simply do what they are told-or risk losing their lucrative deals
with the contractors. The contract research organizations, in turn, answer only to big pharma. That
means the drug companies have nearly total control over these trials.
Id. at 100-01. Dr. Angell summarizes key problems with clinical research. Id. at 239. She makes a strong
argument to check the presence of the biopharmaceutical sectors in medical education:
[D]rug companies pour money into medical schools and teaching hospitals, they support most
continuing medical education, and they subsidize professional meetings. Wherever clinicians are
educated, big pharma is there to help. There is no question that it influences educational content. The
result is that doctors not only receive biased information but learn a very drug-intensive style of
medicine. They come to believe that there is a drug for everything and that new drugs (of which they
have many free samples) are always better than old ones.
Id. at 250.

[FN97]. Id. at 100.
[FN98]. Id. at 102 (“One recent survey showed that two-thirds of academic medical centers hold equity
in start-up companies that sponsor some of their research.”).
[FN99]. Id. at 104. Senior NIH scientists-among the highest paid government employees-also have
financial entanglements. Id. According to 2003 investigative reporting by David Willman published in the
Los Angeles Times, “NIH scientists (who are among the highest paid employees in the government)
routinely supplement their income by accepting large consulting fees and stock options from drug
companies that have dealings with the institutes.” Id. A 1995 change in NIH law under then-Director
Harold Varmus eliminated the restrictions against this outside income, which senior scientists are not
required to disclose: “[A]s of 2003, more than 94 percent of the agency's 2,259 top scientists did not
have to reveal their outside consulting income.” Id. at 104-05.
[FN100]. Id. at 102-03. “[D]rug companies now design clinical trials to be carried out by researchers who
are little more than hired hands-whether the trials are in academic centers or in physicians' offices.

Sponsoring companies keep the data, and in multicenter trials, they may not even let the researchers
themselves see all of it. They also analyze and interpret the results, and decide what, if anything, should
be published.” Id. at 112. “Often, in fact, they publish positive results more than once, in slightly
different forms in different journals. The FDA has no control over this selective publishing. The practice
leads doctors to believe that drugs are much better than they are, and the public comes to share this
belief, on the basis of media reports. There is a general inflation in the notion of the good that drugs can
do (and a deflation in concern about side effects).” Id. Dr. Angell offers examples, including the
antidepressants Zoloft and Paxil and liberal prescribing of estrogen and progesterone hormone
replacement for decades. Id. at 112-13. A NIH study suggested that the combination of hormone
therapy would actually increase-rather than prevent-heart disease. Id. at 113.
[FN101]. Id. at 105-06 (quoting Editorial, Subverting U.S. Health, L.A. Times, Dec. 7, 2003, at M4,
available at 2003 WLNR 15122262). “The pharmaceutical industry is everywhere in Washington, all but
writing the Medicare prescription drug bill, fielding more lobbyists than there are members of Congress,
flinging gifts and trips at doctors and trying to prevent double-blind drug trials that pit one drug against
another, instead of against a placebo.” Editorial, supra.
[FN102]. See Janet Woodcock et al., Development of Novel Combination Therapies, 364 New Eng. J.
Med. 985, 986-87 (2011).
[FN103]. See Rachel Behrman Sherman et al., New FDA Regulation to Improve Safety Reporting in
Clinical Trials, 365 New Eng. J. Med. 3, 3 (2011).
[FN104]. Angell, supra note 12, at 244-46. Dr. Angell has proposed the creation of an institute to oversee
the clinical testing of drugs. Id. In Dr. Angell's words:
To ensure that clinical trials serve a genuine medical need and to see that they are properly designed,
conducted, and reported, I propose that an Institute for Prescription Drug Trials be established within
the National Institutes of Health (NIH) to administer clinical trials of prescription drugs.
....
. . . This is not a perfect process, and there may be better alternatives, but the point is that an
independent, public agency should administer all clinical trials to ensure that they are properly
conducted-both scientifically and ethically.
Id. at 245-46 (emphasis omitted).

[FN105]. See Harris, supra note 12.
[FN106]. Harris, supra note 12; see also FAQ: Proposed National Center for Advancing Translational
Sciences, NIH Feedback, http:// feedback.nih.gov/index.php/faq-ncats/ (lasted updated Jan. 11, 2011)

[[hereinafter NCATS Proposal].
[FN107]. NCATS Proposal, supra note 106. According to the NIH:
This proposed Center is envisioned to be a tremendous resource for the entire translational science
community. It would develop and offer innovative services and expertise in moving promising products
through the development pipeline, as well as develop novel approaches to therapeutics development,
stimulate new avenues for basic scientific discovery, and complement the strengths of existing NIH
research activities.
Id.

[FN108]. See NCATS Proposal, supra note 106; Harris, supra note 12; Gerald Weissmann, Is Drug
Development Too Slow? NIH to the Rescue!, 25 FASEB J. 1119, 1119-20, 1122 (2011). Dr. Collins,
working with an advisory committee and Congress, is proposing to establish the center by reorganizing
NIH-integrating translational research programs, drawing from the National Human Genome Research
Institute, the National Center for Research Resources, and the NIH Director's Common Fund. NCATS
Proposal, supra.
[FN109]. Woodcock et al., supra note 102, at 985.
[FN110]. Mullard, supra note 63, at 83 (“Increasingly, however, firms are moving towards specialty-care
and orphan-disease markets.”). Patient outcomes are becoming an increasing point of focus for
reimbursement. Id.
[FN111]. See discussion supra Part III.
[FN112]. Angell, supra note 12, at 256 (“[Prescription drug companies] are not just squeaking by, as
industry apologists imply, but in recent years are making three to six times the profits earned by other
Fortune 500 companies.”). In 2002, U.S. drug companies reaped more total profits than the profits of all
other Fortune 500 companies combined. Id.
[FN113]. See generally Boozang et al., supra note 11. Government researchers stepped away from
directly engaging in human clinical research, resulting in the present dependency on industry to conduct
the clinical trials necessary to develop innovative new drugs-as documented in a White Paper issued in
the fall of 2009 by Seton Hall Law School. Id.
[FN114]. Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act of 2002, 42 U.S.C. § 284m (2006).
[FN115]. Id.
[FN116]. Nat'l Insts. of Health, Research, NCATS, http:// www.ncats.nih.gov/research/research.html (last

visited Aug. 12, 2012); Nat'l Insts. of Health, Molecular Libraries Probe Production Center, NCATS, http://
www.ncats.nih.gov/research/reengineering/ncgc/mlp/mlppc.html (last visited Aug. 12, 2012). Although
it does not do so often, NIH has conducted clinical trials with great success. For example, the National
Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute conducted a mammoth trial of the treatment of high blood pressure
(hypertension) with over 42,000 subjects at more than 600 clinics. Angell, supra note 12, at 95-96. It was
the largest clinical trial ever done for the treatment of high blood pressure. Id. The trial concluded that
diuretics were just as effective at lowering blood pressure and better at preventing heart disease and
strokes than newer drug alternatives. Id. at 96. Moreover, while diuretics were priced at $37 a year in
2002, a generic angiotensin-converting enzyme inhibitor was priced at $230 and the marquee market
competitor Norvascs was priced at $715. Id. at 97.
[FN117]. Epstein, supra note 25, at 12.
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(2011).
[FN119]. Epstein, supra note 25, at 239-40.
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